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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

OPHELIA ARCHULETTA ARMENTA,
Plaintiff- Appellant,
VS

GRANDVIEW CAFE: STATE INSURANCE
FUND AND INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, as Custodian of the
"Special Fund," provided for
in 35-1-68(1) U.C.A 1953,

SUPREME COURT No. 16038

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the Industrial Commission of Utah denying plaintiff compensation benefits under
35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Industrial Commission denied plaintiff's request
for benefits under 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, Industrial Commission of Utah respectfully
asks that decision of Industrial Commission be confirmed.
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FACTS OF THE CASE
Other than Plaintiff's brief incorrectly stating that
employee had incurred a "permanent incapacity by accidential
injury, disease, or congenital causes" and incorrectly using
the terms "impairment and disability"as synonymous in the
doctor's reports the Defendant Industrial Commission accepts
the Facts of the Case as given by Plaintiff.
The Record does not indicate a previously incurred
incapacity.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

PRIOR PERMANENT INCAPACITY IS A PRIOR AND PERMANENT
LOSS OF EARNING POWER WHICH WAS KNOWN AND WHICH
AFFECTED EMPLOYEE'S ABILITY TO WORK.
Section 35-l-69, Utah Code Annotated is triggered by
certain mandatory conditions.

Umess these conditions are met

there is no apportionment under that section.

These manditory

conditions are:
1.

The previously incurred incapacity must have been

incurred prior to industrial accident.
2.

The previously incurred incapacity must have been

permanent in nature.
3.

The previously incurred incapacity must have a loss

of earning power affected employee's abbility to work, and
which, in turn, resulted in a loss of earning power.
The word incapacity in workmen's compensation law means
a loss of ability to work and loss of earning powers. Incapacity
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is often used synonymously with disability and is to be distinguished from impairment which is a medical computation of
physical enjury.
Word ~ncapacity" as used in statutes
providing for award of compensation for
partial and total incapacity means earning, incapacity, not physical incapacity.
Barry v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 211 S.E.2d
595, 600, 133 Ga. App. 527.
"Incapacity" within compensation statute means incapacity to work, as distinguished from loss or loss of use of
member of body.
Panico v. Sperry Engineering Co., 156 A. 802, 804, 113 Conn. 707
The "incapacity" referred to in statutes
providing for compensation for total incapacity and for partial incapacity, is
loss of earning capacity due to injury and
not due to employee's unwillingness to
work or to economic conditions of unemployment.
Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware
Ins. Co. v. Whiddon, 75 S.E.2d 830, 833,
88 Ga. App. 12.
Any deprivation of employee's power
to work as result of injury is "Incapacity"
within Workmen's Compensation Act.
Rice v.
Denny Roll & Panel Co., 154 S.E. 69, 71,
199 N.C. 154.
Employee receiving a broken arm held
not entitled to compensation under Vernon's
Ann.Civ.St. art. 8306 §§10, 11, as for
"incapacity" to work, where he continued to
perform his duties and was paid full wages;
"incapacity" meaning lack of capacity, lack
of ability or qualification, etc.
Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Coody, Tex.Civ.App.
278 s.1v. 856, 858.
Section of Workmen's Compensation Act
providing for modificaiton of compensation
agreement and review of award for increase
incapacity uses the words "disability" and
"incapacity" synonymously.
Colbert v. Consolidated Laundry, 107 A.2d 521, 524, 31
N.J.Super. 588.
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The terms "disability" and "incapacity"
as used in workmen's compensation statutes
are synonymous and former ordinarily means
loss or impairment of earning power or actual physical incapacity to work at all or
to work more than a part of the time.
Scott
v. Alaska Indus. Bd., D.C.Alaska, 91 F.
Supp. 201 202.
Words "injury" and "incapacity" are not
synonymous for workmen's compensation purposes.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bearden, Tex.Civ.
App., 373 S.W.2d 300, 302.
New York case law mandate that employer knew of the incapacity at time of hiring.
Law (59-33) p.

Larson's Workmen's Compensation

321 commented on these decisions of the N.Y.Sup.

Ct. by saying:
The legislation (second injury fund
apportionments) should not be extended
to prior conditions of such character
that employers would "resumably" be unaware of them and therefore be unaffected
by them in their hiring practices.
California has the test as quoted by Larsen at 59-33,
page 330:
Whether the prior condition was "labor
disability".
.that is whether if industrial
it would be independently capable of supporting an award.
And in a rather recent Washington case:
The total disability was due to a back
and hip injury, combining with a pre-existing, nondisability arthritic condition aggravated by the injury.
The court held that
since the arthritis had not been disabling,
the employer was not entitled to have part
of the award paid by the second injury fund.
Lyle, Inc. v. Dept of Labor & Industry, 66
Wash., 745, 405P.2 251.
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Sec. 69 is not the easiest section to interpret in the
Utah Code and there are parts of it which may yet resist logical
interpretation.

But a reading of the Workmen's Compensation Law

and decisions concerning the words incapacity and disability
have no confusion.

The almost erroneous conclusion is that the

incapacity and disability spoken of in second injury funds is
an incapacity to do the work that results in loss of earning
power.
Once again applying this to sec. 69 we come up with the
necessary conditions to trigger the apportionment to the Second
Injury Fund of pre-exisiting incapacity.
1.

Incapacity that was prior to Industrial
accident.

2.

Incapacity that was permanent in nature.

3.

Incapacity that was known and involved in
the hiring procedure and which showed lack
of earning power and ability to work.

These are fundemental requirements in almost, if not all,
second injury fund states.

And it is important once more to

note that in Ortega none of these conditions existed when all
three are manditory.
It would seem to be redundant to say that when we define
the word "incapacity" in section 69 it must mean inability to
~ork

and loss of earning power.

This applies to both the pre-

existing incapacity and the incapacity resulting from the industrial accident.
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In the instant case there is nothing in the record that
indicates plaintiff was handicapped in her ability to work and
that she had a resultant loss of earnings becuase of her previous

neck problems.
And when the doctors and medical panel experts speak of
"impairment" it shoudl not be confused with "incapacity."
POINT II.
TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY IS
NOT APPORTINABLE.
The respondent, Industrial Commission of Utah, relies
upon the arguments submitted in the brief in the combined cases
of Paris Co., Nebo School District and White v. Industrial Commission of Utah and numbered 15882, 15881 and 15796 on the issues
of apportionment of Temporary total disability compensation and
medical expenses incurred during temporary total disability.
A copy of that brief is made a part of this brief on the
issues named.

It sould be noted that these issues are all the

result of the "Ortega" decision.

This court has not yet handed

down its decision on these combined cases.
See Point II of attached combined brief on Temporary
Total Disability is not apportionable.
POINT III.
MEDICAL EXPENSES ARE NOT APPORTIONABLE
DURING TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY.
See Point III of attached combined brief on medical
expenses.

They are not apportionable during temporary total

disability.
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CONCLUSION
The ruling of the Industrial Commission sould be
affirmed.
Dated this

~day of September, 1979.

FRANK V. NELSON

MA I L I N G

C E R T I F I C A T E

I certify that two copies of the foregoing brief were
mailed, postage prepaid to Andrew R. Hurley, lOll Walker Bank
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, attorney for Plaintiff;
and two copies mailed to James R. Black, Esq., Suite 500, Ten
\~est

Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101, this

-./Kday

f,

of

September, 1979.
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